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Nationwide Branching: 
the Canadian Case 
The prospect of interstate banking in the 
United States has stirred popular debate re-
cenHy. Opponents of interstate banking fear 
that the net resu It of  such a practice wi  II be 
tremendous consolidation with, eventually, 
only a few large banks remaining. They feel 
.  this will cause a deterioration in the quality of 
banking services along with disadvantageous 
changes in prices. As evidence to support 
their argument, the opponents often cite the 
structure of  Canadian banking. 
(  In  the surface, the comparison seems rea-
sonable. Nationwide branching is allowed in 
Canada and branches are abundant. The 
banks, however, number only eleven, com-
pared to a·U.S. total of  over 14,500-a  differ-
ence that cannot be explained by population 
alone. This seems to support the argument 
that economies of  scale will ensure that a 
group of  a few, powerful banks will ultimately 
resu It from a more liberal branching policy in 
this country. However, a closer look reveals 
several differences between the-banking 
environments of  the U.S. and Canada that 
suggest this conclusion may be premature. 
The Canadian regulatory environment, rather 
than economies of  scale, may be the better 
explanation for the evolution of  Canada's 
banking structure. 
Canadian banking structure 
The eleven chartered banks in Canada to-
gether have approximately 7,000 branches, 
each branch serving on average about 3,300 
people. They are large banks by most stan-
dards, having an average of  over $25 billion 
in total assets, with the average among the top 
(  ·~erou~hlytwic~thatamount.lnfact,  fiv~of 
.:." ..... anada s banks rank among the largest SIXty-
:,:"  five banks in the world in terms of  both assets 
and deposits, a claim probably unmatched by 
,  any other country of  comparable size. 
The "Big Five", as they are called, are nation-
al in scope, while the six smaller banks are 
primarily provincial with one metropolitan-
oriented. All banks are federally-chartered by 
law and governed by the Bank Act. Neverthe-
less~ Canadian statutes do not clearly define 
the business of banking, and, as a result, the 
activities of  chartered banks overlap those of 
other financial institutions. 
Commercial banking is primarily the domain 
of  the chartered banks but these banks also 
compete in most retail or consumer product 
markets with "near banks'" -over  sixty trust 
and mortgage loan companies, and over 
3,500 credit  unions and "caisses populaires" 
(cooperative institutions similar to credit 
unions). Over the years, near banks have 
gained in market share, but banks remain 
dominant, holding approximately 75 percent 
of  the assets and 63 percent of  the deposits of 
all major depository institutions in Canada. 
The near banks are comparable to u.s. 
savings and loan assocations, credit unions 
and consumerfinance companies. They hold 
a similar market share of  deposits at about 37 
percent and focus mainly on the retail bank-
ing markets, primarily deposit-taking and 
consumer loans, especially mortgages. These 
institutions also enjoy some privileges not 
accorded to banks. Interest rate differentials, 
for example, existed in both countries until 
1967 when Canada lifted its maximum of 
6 percent on bank loans. Near banks in both 
countries also were not required to hold 
reserves until 1980 when the U.S. removed 
this exemption. Some near banks in the u.s. 
and Canada still enjoy  certain tax advantages. 
These similarities in banking structure belie 
the major differences in banking regulations 
between the two countries. One of  these dif-
ferences is branching law. While Canada has 
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always allowed nationwide branching, indi-
vidual states make their own branching laws 
in the U.S. Many  of  these laws still allow only 
unit banking, and in most of  the U.s., they 
restrict interstate branching. 
Regulatory history in Canada 
Canada has not always had as few banks. 
In 1875, it had 51 despite nationwide branch-
ing and a much smaller population. There 
is evidence that changes in government 
policy toward banking contributed to the 
later reduction. 
Until 1900, Canada had a strict merger policy 
that required applicants to obtain approval 
from Parliament. This process was simplified 
in 1900 when, many Canadian analysts con-
clude, the government began activel}'-.to· 
encourage mergers. There were more mer-
gers (28) among Canadian banks between 
1900 and 1930than in all ofthe rest of  Can  a-
dian banking history combined. 
At approximately the same time, new bank 
charters became more difficult to obtain. In 
1890, the paid-in capital requirements for a 
new bank almost tripled from $100,000 to 
$250,000. In addition, investors were al-
lowed on  Iy one year from the ti  me the charter 
was granted to the time operations had to 
begin with full capital. This change in char-
tering policy seems to have greatly reduced 
new entry. Before 1890, an average of  over 
eleven banks entered the banking market 
each decade. In the following  ten years, there 
was not one new entrant. Moreover, the 
number of  charters received but not used 
increased after 1890. All these changes com-
bined to create a more restrictive entry policy. 
Economist Dale Orr, in a study on entry into 
Canadian banking markets, estimated that 
there should have been two new bank entries 
per year in the period 1963-67 when there 
had actually been only one entrant in those 
four years. Indeed, Canada has had only five 
new banks in the past fifty years. He con-
cluded that this low rate of  entry cannot be 
explained by natural economic barriers. 
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Policy or economics? 
The econom  ic evidence I  inki  ng the Canadian 
banking structure mainly to its regulatory 
environment is not conclusive, but it does 
suggest that Canadian banks enjoy protection· 
from fully-effective competition. A study by 
the Economic Council of  Canada in 1976 
revealed that the profits of  Canadian banks 
were much higher than those of other Cana-
dian industries examined in the same 1968-
1973 period. The additional findings that 
Canadian banks were less cost-efficient and 
Canadian bank profits (even after adjusting 
for differing tax structures) higherthan those 
of  their U.S. counterparts implied the exis-
tence of  substantial market power. 
Several other institutional factors re"inforce .  (  .. 
the idea that the chartered banks of  Canada 
enjoy an environment different from their 
U.S. counterparts. First, the absence of  acen-
tral, publicly-operated check-clearing system 
allows the few chartered banks to operate this 
portion of the payment mechanism and to 
playa role that may give them market advan-
tages over potential competitors. Second, as a 
recent report of  the Royal Commission on 
Banking and Finance observed, the banks 
tend to act as a group rather than as individ-
uals in response to near bank competition 
and they tend to compete among themselves 
through services rather than prices. Both are 
classic indications that they operate in a less 
than competitive environment. Third, foreign 
banks have always found the Canadian bank-
ing market attractive but their full-fledged 
entry into that market has been legislatively 
restricted. This, too, suggests that the existing 
banking structure may not be the natural one 
generated by economics alone. 
Canadian concern about these effects.of gov-
ernment policy has already prompted regula-
tors to re-examine some banking regulation.s  .. (. 
The Bank Act of 1967 began to place char-
tered banks and near banks on more equal:';\!,.:.'. 
footing. This process has continued with the.'"· 
Bank Act of  1980 wh  ich removed more of  the 
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Population  per organization 
The new laws allow near banks and foreign 
banking offices to become operating banks, 
but we know of no near bank that has made 
the conversion. While this would seem to 
indicate that the economies associated with 
large size are crucial to profitable Canadian 
banking, some additional facts must be kept 
in mind. 
Near banks may be slow to convert because 
they have established expertise in certain 
banking areas and, particularly in the current 
environment, would incur large costs if  they 
were to  provide  full  banking  services.  In 
addition, the provincial charter near banks 
usually must hold in addition to any Federal 
(
charter can further restrict their activities. 
.  ne near banks also enjoy certain tax 
..... vantages and reserves exemptions which 
they would have to relinquish ifthey were to· 
become chartered banks. In sum,there 
remain specific barriers to the entry of near 
banks into the chartered ba~king  market. 
The California contrast 
The experience of  California's banking mar-
ket raises more questions about the relevance 
ofthe Canadian case to the branching debate 
in the U.S. California is similar to Canada in 
population (23 million) and has a gross state 
product of  $250 billion versus Canada's GNP 
of $290 billion. California also allows state-
wide branching, which is analogous to Cana-
da's nationwide branching albeit in a smaller 
geographic area. 
In California, however, there are 260 com-
mercial banks compared to Canada's eleven. 
Moreover, there are numerous new entrants 
3 




in the California banking market each year. In 
1980 alone, 47 new banks entered the market. 
The relative abundance of banks in this State 
is due largely to a liberal entry policy for 
newly formed banks reinforced by a more 
restrictive merger pol icy. It is true that the 
California banking market is fairly concen-
trated" with the top five banks having over 
seventy percent of  the market share of  depos-
its, but this share is shrinking and numerous 
smaller banks offer major competition in lo-
cal markets. In Marin county, for example, 
the Bank of  Marin, a small organization on a 
statewide scale, has the largest share of  the 
county market. In addition, the largest Cali-
fornia banks are drawing significant deposits 
from outside the State, so their simple deposit 
share overstates their dominance in the State 
and local markets. 
The combined evidence suggests that natural 
economies of  scale do not  necessarily dictate 
low levels of  bank competition. 
Implications for U.s. banking structure 
It is impossible to predict from the available 
evidence in Canada how  the u.s. banking 
structure wou  Id evolve if  nationwide  branch-
ing were allowed. There have been enough 
legislative barriers in Canada to alert us to  the 
possibility that Canada is not necessarily a 
good model. We can, however, conclude 
from the Canadian and Californian experi-
ences that interstate branching, if  allowed in 
the United States, would not necessarily lead 
to market dominance by a few banking giants. 
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICf 
(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets ~  Liabilities 
Large Commercial Banks 
I 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate\ 
loans to in.dividuals 
Securities Ipans 
U.s. Treasurvlsecurities* 
Other securit es* 
Demand deposits - total# 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposit!! - total 
Time deposits ..;.. total# 
Individuali part. & corp. 
(large neg  liable CD's) 
Weekly Aver41;f 
of Daily Figur  . 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Resertes (+  )/Deficiency (-) 
Borrowings q 
Net free reserves (+  l/Net borrowed( -) 
• Excludes tfading account securities. 
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Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
8,015  5.3 
9,242  7.1 
4,612  11.7 
3,215  5.9 
467  2.0 
859  58.0 
365  6.1 
1/592  - 10.5 
1,066  - 2.7 
438  - 1.6 
1,170  4.0 
13,641  15.8 
12,114  15.5 
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